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L I L A  A B U - L U G H O D A good deal of literature, before and 
since the publication of Edward Said’s 
Orientalism and then Covering Islam, 
has taught us the myriad ways in which 
Islam has been represented negatively 
in the West. But long before the spec-
tacular and specular violence of the 
exploding World Trade Center in New 
York City, many countries in the Arab 
Middle East had within their midst Is-
lamist political groups that were op-
positional to the regimes in power. In 
Egypt during the 1980s and 90s, for example, there was a sharp sense 
in elite circles and a widespread discourse disseminated through popu-
lar media that the nation was in danger of being torn apart from within. 
The state was portrayed as facing a political-cultural crisis, one that it 
dealt with mostly by force—through arrests, executions, and the arbi-
trary powers of a continually renewed state of emergency. The problem 
was represented publicly as religious extremism. The villains were the 
members of Islamic groups.
In the early 1990s I embarked on an ethnographic project to under-
stand television’s place in the Egyptian national imagination and in 
the everyday lives of people who are somewhat marginal to the na-
tion—people who are neither middle class nor urban. I focused on the 
most popular genre of television programming, one for which Egypt is 
justly famous across the Arab world: the dramatic serial. Unlike soap 
operas, Egyptian serials are finite, consisting of 15 or 30 episodes, 
shown on consecutive evenings. And, because until well into the 1990s 
there were only a few television channels and first-run serials aired on 
only two of them, they were watched by a majority of the population 
and were often the subject of discussion in homes, and in the public 
sphere—in newspapers, magazines, and elsewhere. I was intrigued to 
find that television serials were often the vehicles for national debate. 
One of the big debates that television became part of in the mid-1990s 
was about what was called “extremism” or even “terrorism.” 
Television drama in Egypt in the 1990s reflected, if unevenly and 
with certain lags, concerns about the place of religion in society and 
nation. In keeping with its self-consciously pedagogical mission, it 
condemned, preached, and offered alternative models for the future. 
Accordingly, this research raised questions such as: Were television se-
rials effective in their missions of smoothing over the divisions that, 
in the name of religion, threatened the Egyptian national body? Did 
media management of religion help create national community? Did 
mass media participate in the configuration and reconfiguration of “re-
ligion” and “nation” in Egypt? How did media representations of Islamic 
groups and “terrorists” operate in a Muslim majority context where, un-
like in the West, the civilizational discourse of West and East could not 
be mobilized, Islamists or terrorists could only partially be represented 
as an outside enemy, and Islam could never be the alien other? 
Good and bad Islam
Beginning in the late 1970s the rising visibility on the streets of 
Cairo and provincial cities and towns of a self-conscious Islamic iden-
tity represented a phenomenon that was noticeable to everyone and 
troubling to some. The movement ranged from increased piety among 
educated youth to some more sensational acts of violence committed 
by militant Islamic groups. The broad piety movement and the wide-
spread feeling against cordoning off 
religion as a private matter of faith led 
television to capitulate to the desire for 
more religious programming and to try 
to appropriate for itself the role of sup-
porter of a legitimate Islam. 
In 1994, just after a new policy of 
confronting terrorism with media was 
announced, the serial The Family (al-
A’ila), was produced to great fanfare, 
and some controversy. Written by 
Wahid Hamid, it showed, in its assess-
ment by critics, how educated youth from disadvantaged backgrounds 
were drawn into terrorism, and how corruption was rife in these 
groups. Public opposition to the serial, not surprisingly, came from 
well-established moderate Islamist thinkers. In their jockeying in the 
press, both the moderate Islamist thinkers and government and televi-
sion officials tried to align themselves with the religious authorities of 
al-Azhar. The Islamists stressed the number of letters and phone calls 
al-Azhar had received, urging them to take action to get the serial off 
the air. Controversy over a scene in which the enlightened modernist 
protagonist challenged the extremist on the doctrinal basis of certain 
beliefs had led to calls to halt broadcast of the serial. The Mufti, the 
leading government religious authority, used the press to clarify doc-
trine and offer a set of phone numbers for the public to use if they had 
questions about religious matters. The Minister of Information, how-
ever, speaking about a television broadcast that followed the serial (a 
documentary in which Islamist prisoners spoke about the error of their 
ways), responded with a statement that points to the heart of the of-
ficial construction of religion. He said, “[T]here are repenters who speak 
with remorse and … discuss how it was that they came to …lose their 
faith in those erroneous ideas that led them to commit deviant terror-
ist activities…” Serials like The Family contrast the good, correct, and 
reasonable Islam of the people, the cultured and educated, al-Azhar, 
the state, and television with that of the bad, violent, misinformed, and 
twisted Islam of the extremists. 
Many television writers claim to be secularists—that is, to believe in 
a separation between personal piety and the state, a legacy of their 
intellectual and political formation in the Nasserist period of the 1950s 
and 1960s that pushed secular ideals. Yet, despite the objections of 
such prominent television personnel and their own relative silence on 
religion in their serials, Egyptian television continued to increase reli-
gious programming in the 1990s, adding to the popular shows featur-
ing Quranic exegeses by religious authorities big budget serials about 
the history of the Arab-Islamic world. These were broadcast alongside 
many more serials with plots or subplots about violent militants and 
serials explicitly about terrorism. There was good Islam and bad Islam 
and these judgments were made, ultimately, on the basis of how Islam 
related to the nation and social responsibility. They were not, as they 
might have been in the past, part of the struggle among religious au-
thorities. 
Restoring the honour of Upper Egypt 
For more than half a century, revenge killing, or the vendetta, has 
been in the national imagination the cultural trait most associated with 
Upper Egypt. The obsession of northern, urban, educated people with 
the horrors of honour feuds and their condemnation of Upper Egyp-
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tians as backward and unenlightened 
can be found everywhere, from film 
to social science. Without denying the 
existence or importance of this prac-
tice to communities in the region, one 
must still be suspicious whenever a 
cultural trait is singled out and made 
to stand for a whole region or commu-
nity and one must be even more sus-
picious when such a region is mapped 
as a place of new forms of violence: in 
the 1980s and 1990s Upper Egypt was 
linked to religious extremism. 
However, a major shift occurred in 
the second half of the 1990s in televi-
sion representations of Upper Egypt. 
The most popular of the serials to 
represent Upper Egypt balanced the 
theme of revenge with that of authen-
tic values such as honour and integrity. 
The recent spate of serials set in Upper 
Egypt that depict positive qualities of 
the region are mostly the work of one 
writer, himself originally from Upper 
Egypt. Although based in Alexandria, 
Muhammad Safa’ `Amir makes much of 
the fact that he was born in an Upper 
Egyptian town not far from Luxor. 
Even those from the south single out 
his work as not stereotyping them negatively, describing his serials as 
realistic because they focus on their “true” characteristics: generosity, 
courage, honesty, and valour. What these serials suggest is that Upper 
Egyptians are part of the nation; they do not live in a closed society 
and do not constitute a backward or frightening “other.” The most im-
portant message is that they are by no means all religious extremists. 
Upper Egyptians, on the other hand, are being told through the serials 
that they have within their own traditions important values worth pre-
serving and nurturing, values that are social, cultural, and regional, not 
particularly tied to religion. In other words, their true identities are not 
as Islamists but rather as people with an indigenous regional nobility 
and code of honour. 
The attempts of the media to promote a culture stripped of religion 
may be even less healing of the torn civic body than its attempts to 
turn religion into a cultural system linked to the nation. This is because 
it bears little resemblance to local experiences. But insofar as regional 
values are offered as cultural ideals, the serials invoke a national frame, 
since regions are primarily defined by national territory. Upper Egypt 
only has meaning as a distinct region if understood as part of a larger 
Egyptian nation. And so again, the serials offer support for a united na-
tion and a placing of religion within that nation. 
Religion in a national public sphere
Recent work on Islamism and the history of Muslim reform in Egypt 
reminds us that mass media, from the press that flourished in the late 
nineteenth century to the television of the late twentieth century, is 
part of a distinct public sphere in which public intellectuals could de-
bate and discuss norms, policies, and the future of the community and 
civilization. Scholars have been concerned about what the outlines of 
this public sphere are and how the changing terms of debate and dis-
cussion are set.
The Egyptian intelligentsia who produce television, film, theatre, and 
literature must be understood as having a certain independence from 
the state and labouring to a large extent in their own cultural fields. 
Yet there are significant points of collaboration and convergence be-
tween intellectuals and the state today. Nasserism had contributed 
to the doctrine of a demarcation of separate spheres of religion and 
state, even if Islamic ideals were never completely purged from mo-
rality, pious practices continued in all classes, and various accommo-
dations were forged between state and religious institutions. What 
seems to be one of the outcomes of the debates in which television 
programs of the 1990s participated, is that religion has become once 
more an ideological hub of the public sphere, but now with a certain 
form of the modern nation-state so entrenched and established that 
“the nation,” and what is good for the nation, forms the only legiti-
mate ground for debates about religion. This is even so when viewers 
explicitly disagree with or criticize the representations of Islamists, or 
religiosity, that they watch. 
The airing of these serials ends up, in a variety of ways, revealing and 
exacerbating social cleavages, perhaps undermining the government’s 
and some secular intellectuals’ intentions of creating national commu-
nity by trying to discredit Islamists. This is mostly because television’s 
enthusiasm for circumscribing religious sensibilities in its serials rubs 
up against widespread convictions. However, one should not infer 
from these failures that television does not foster national community 
through its treatments of religious extremism. It does so indirectly, 
though, by appropriating for itself the role of a charged and popular 
arena for public discussion of and debate about Islam. The arena is na-
tional and in this way contributes to an ongoing sense of the nation as 
the critical frame for all aspects of life, including the religious. 
Even Egyptian television’s negative stereotyping of Islamists, however 
accepted or refused by the public, operates within and reinforces the 
frame of the nation. It never places the Muslim outside the frame; in-
stead it makes and sustains distinctions between good and bad Muslims. 
It also reflects on what place religious identity and observance should 
have in daily life and asks what role Islam should have in society at large. 
Even though some of the negative imagery used to represent Islamists 
in Egyptian television may be eerily similar to that which is becoming 
numbingly familiar in the West, the contexts of reception and the import 
of this imagery give it a fundamentally different meaning. 
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 Note
1. The lecture by Lila Abu-Lughod was 
derived largely from Chapter 7 of 
her most recent book, Dramas of 
Nationhood: The Politics of Television in 
Egypt (University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
The full text of the lecture will also be 
available as an ISIM Paper.
